Consistency, Choice, and Rationality by Walter Bossert PDF

By Walter Bossert

ISBN-10: 0674052994

ISBN-13: 9780674052994

In Consistency, selection, and Rationality, monetary theorists Walter Bossert and Kotaro Suzumura current a radical mathematical remedy of Suzumura consistency, an alternative choice to demonstrated coherence homes corresponding to transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity. functions in person and social selection idea, fields very important not just to economics but in addition to philosophy and political technology, are mentioned. in particular, the authors discover issues akin to rational selection and printed choice conception, and collective selection making in an atemporal framework in addition to in an intergenerational surroundings.

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The symmetric factor I (R) of R is defined by I (R) = {(x, y) | (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R}. The asymmetric factor P(R) of R is defined by P(R) = {(x, y) | (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R}. 1 Binary Relations 33 The non-comparable factor NC(R) of R is defined by NC(R) = {(x, y) ∈ X × X | (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R}. If R is interpreted as a weak preference relation, that is, (x, y) ∈ R means that x is considered at least as good as y, P(R), I (R), and NC(R) can be interpreted as the strict preference relation, the indifference relation, and the non-comparability relation corresponding to R, respectively.

The presence of another apple (z) makes one of the two apples decently choosable, but the combination of choices would violate the standard consistency condition . . even though there is nothing particularly ‘inconsistent’ in this pair of choices. . 1), namely, that the feasible set itself conveys information about the nature of the options contained therein. This is what Sen (1993, p. 502) refers to as the epistemic value of a menu. The observation that feasible sets may have epistemic value has been made before.

Moreover, he showed that if anonymity is weakened to finite anonymity—which restricts the application of the standard anonymity requirement to situations where utility streams differ in at most a finite number of components—and a continuity requirement is added, an impossibility results again. 10 Beyond Finite-Population Social Choice 31 Pareto, finite anonymity, and representability by a real-valued function are incompatible. Asheim and Tungodden (2004) provide a characterization of an infinitehorizon version of the leximin principle by adding an equity-preference condition and a preference-continuity property to strong Pareto and finite anonymity.

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Consistency, Choice, and Rationality by Walter Bossert

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